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Abstract
Since the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, global 
counterterrorism policies have increasingly targeted terrorist financing sources. These increased 
financial counterterrorism regulations have diverted the traditional sources and methods of 
terrorist funding, including illicit drug revenue streams. The purpose of this paper is to measure 
the relationship between terrorist events (both domestic and transnational) and the prices of 
cocaine and heroin. Using regression analysis, I find that the annual U.S. illicit drug prices of 
heroin are statistically significant with domestic and transnational terrorist events. These results 
suggest that future counterterrorism policies should continue to be used in conjunction with 
counter narcotic policies.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this research is to measure the relationship between illicit drug prices and 
terrorist events, in order to determine the likelihood that terrorist organizations are using 
revenues from narcotics trafficking for violent means. Regression analysis is used to determine 
the link between U.S. cocaine and heroin prices with domestic and transnational terrorist events 
from 1981-2007. While numerous types of illicit drugs are consumed, cocaine and heroin are 
chosen for this research because the terrorist groups who are believed to benefit from the drug 
trade are speculated to mainly capitalize from cocaine and heroin trafficking. Furthermore, 
cocaine and heroin are produced from plants are only grown in certain regions. Due to the illicit 
nature of narcotics, data on narcotics in general is limited; despite these limitations, cocaine and 
heroin have the most complete and reliable data out of all illicit drugs.
Current counterterrorism policies are used in conjunction with counter narcotic policies. 
For instance, in 2008 the United States spent approximately $1.54 billion in counter narcotic 
operations (Bennett, 2010). Bennett (2010) argues that using counter narcotic policies in 
conjunction with counterterrorism policies is counterproductive. Therefore, it is important to 
determine the legitimacy and ultimately the effectiveness of counter narcotic policies use in 
combating terrorism.
The nature of modern day terrorism has changed drastically from the traditional state- 
sponsored terrorism model, leaving counter terrorism officials and the government to predict 
terrorists’ sources of funding. Terrorist attacks are decreasing; however, they are becoming 
more lethal (Campos and Gassebner, 2013). As democratic governments persistently thwart
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terrorist activities, it is important that they continue including the correct multipronged policies 
and adjust policies to diminish alternative funding sources as terrorist groups adapt.
In the next section, I discuss the determinants of terrorism, types of terrorism, the nature 
of the illicit drug market for cocaine and heroin, and the nexus of illicit drugs and terrorism. The 
third section presents the regression models used and explains the independent variables used in 
the regressions. Section 3.1 provides an explanation of the initial regression used and the 
independent variables utilized. After conducting my initial regressions, I expanded my model to 
test country specific terrorism data; section 3.2 explains the model expansion. In the fourth 
section, I present the regression results and provide analysis of the results for the initial 
regression in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 details the regression results and analysis from the 
expanded model. The last section details conclusions based on the regression results and the 
policy implication of these results.
2. Literature Review
Young and Findley (2011) notice that terrorism literature prior to the September 11th, 
2001, terrorist attacks are plentiful; however, after the attacks terrorism literature, mainly 
qualitative in nature, surged (Young and Findley, 2011). Although terrorism has become a hot- 
topic in research throughout the past decade, basic disputes over the definition of terrorism still 
exist. Currently, there are over 100 different definitions for terrorism; most terrorism definitions 
merely employ a change in vocabulary or the inclusion of additional criteria. Differing 
definitions cause issues for researchers, analysts, and especially data gatherers.
Enders and Sandler (2006) provide the definition of terrorism commonly used throughout 
terrorism literature: “Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or
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subnational groups in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a 
large audience beyond that of the immediate victims” (Enders and Sandler, 2006, 3). The most 
widely disputed aspect of terrorism is centered on the determinants of terrorism and what makes 
an individual more prone to terrorism.
In general, economists view every individual’s choices as rational choices, in which one 
evaluates his or her costs and benefits of action, and acts on what benefits him or her most. The 
rational assumption is oftentimes applied to terrorist decisions, as well. Turek (2009) prescribes 
to the rational assumption for terrorist actions and states that other disciplines, such as political 
science, utilize a similar ‘rational-choice theory’. Krieger and Meierrieks (2008) list additional 
causes of terrorism cited throughout terrorism literature: “economic deprivation, modernization, 
political and institutional order, political transformation and instability, identity and cultural 
clash, globalization, and contagion.”
2.1 Determinants of Terrorism
It is important to remember that determinants have different implications and meanings 
depending on which aspect of terrorism one is referring to- the perpetrator, the victim, the 
targeted audience, the location, or the type of attack. Gassebner and Luechinger (2011) run 
regressions on sixty-five previously cited variables using three different terrorism datasets in 
order to test determinants of terrorism. They assess the many conflicting terrorism research 
papers which mostly cite democracy and poverty as causes of terrorism. Both the presence of 
democracy and lack of democracy can contribute to terrorism. Enders and Sandler (2006) 
suggest that the liberties present in democratic countries can provide more freedom for terrorists 
to plan and carry out attacks, while the lack of democracy can fuel political frustrations.
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Gassebner and Luechinger’s (2011) results show that terrorism is not positively related to 
democracy and that terrorism is not associated with economic development, leading one to assert 
that poverty does not cause terrorism. Interestingly, they found that a negative relationship does 
exist between economic freedom and terrorism, implying that economic opportunities are more 
significant that economic development.
2.2 Types of Terrorism
Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011) argue that terrorist events should be further 
categorized into national and transnational events for proper evaluation purposes. National 
events are those events in which the location, target(s) (person or place), and the terrorist(s) are 
in or from the same country. Transnational events are terrorism events in which the target(s), 
perpetrator(s), and victim(s) are from different countries. The distinction between transnational 
and national terrorist events is important because both types of terrorist events have different 
implications, such as modus operandi, motivation, and cost. For instance, domestic terrorist 
attacks on average represent a struggle for independence, while transnational terrorist attacks 
may represent a different frustration. Most terrorist attacks are national terrorist attacks, referred 
to as ‘domestic terrorist attacks’ by Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011).
2.3 Illicit Drugs
The illicit drug market has historically served as a source of funding for terrorist 
organizations. The illicit drug market is comprised of several different types of illegal narcotics: 
marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), prescription medications, 
and various forms derived from these narcotics. Three of these drugs are plant-based; marijuana 
is derived from the hemp plant, cocaine from the coca bush, and heroin from the poppy plant
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(UN World Drug, 2012). Marijuana can be cultivated anywhere in the world due to improved 
indoor hydroponic systems. The coca bush is grown only in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia (Mejia 
and Posada, 2008). The poppy plant is cultivated mainly in Afghanistan and Burma (Myanmar); 
however, in the past it has been grown in other regions (UN World Drug, 2012).
According to the UN World Drug Report (2012), marijuana and ATS, with the exception 
of ‘ecstasy,’ are the most consumed narcotics globally. In the United States, cocaine 
consumption is second to marijuana, and in Europe, heroin consumption is second to marijuana 
and cocaine ranks third (Mejia and Posada, 2008). Mejia and Posada (2008) state that despite the 
popularity of cocaine and heroin, consumption of these illicit drugs does seem to fluctuate 
similar to a ‘life-cycle.’ For instance, the demand for cocaine in the U.S. decreased from 1985- 
1993, but has stabilized since 1993. According to Caulkins (2004) the prices of cocaine and 
heroin have dramatically decreased since the 1980s; the majority of the decrease in prices took 
place during the 1980s. In respect to cocaine, there was an initial 55% decrease in prices in the 
1980s, a 30-50% increase in prices from 1989-1990, and a steady decrease in prices throughout 
the 1990s. Overall, heroin prices have decreased 85% since 1981 (also see Table 2 and Figure 3 
for U.S. cocaine and heroin annual prices). There has been a relative stabilization in the price and 
consumption of cocaine and heroin in the ‘mature markets’ (North America, Europe, and 
typically, Oceania). Not much data is known about the emerging illicit drug markets; however, 
the data gathered during illicit drug seizures suggests that consumption for cocaine is expanding 
in Eastern Europe, East Africa, Oceania, and South America; heroin consumption is increasing in 
both Asia and Africa (UN World Drug, 2012).
Why did the prices of cocaine and heroin decrease so drastically in the 1980s? Storti and 
De Grauwe (2009) find that globalization is the reason for the sharp decreases in prices. The
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wave of globalization brought about cheaper transportation costs, reduced risk and increased 
competition. This resulted in a reduction of the intermediation margin, which is the difference in 
the retail price and the price of the farmer’s supply, essentially referring to profit. For both 
heroin and cocaine, the intermediation margin decreased by at least 50% between 1990 and 
2005-2006, except for the intermediation margin for U.S. heroin, which reduced by 32%. Storti 
and De Grauwe (2009) also note that because of globalization certain regions had a comparative 
advantage in illicit drug production.
It is important to note the price elasticities of demand for cocaine and heroin, because 
elasticity exhibits how much quantity demanded for a product will change given a one percent 
increase/decrease in price for that product. Due to the addictive nature of cocaine and heroin, one 
may assume that even as prices increase, consumption will remain the same, thus meaning that 
narcotics are perfectly inelastic. However, most studies find that illicit drug users are sensitive to 
price. According to a 2000 report by Abt Associates, the price elasticity of demand for cocaine 
is -0.26 and heroin is -0.17(Storti and De Grauwe, 2009). Many drug users consume more than 
one type of illicit drug at a time, so if the price of a certain type of drug increases the user can 
substitute for a cheaper type of drug or reduce the number of different drugs they are consuming 
(UN World Drug, 2012).
International organizations and governments use counternarcotic programs to reduce crop 
cultivation, despite these efforts, narco- traffickers have adapted. Mejia and Posada (2008) 
report that between 2000 and 2003 there was a decrease in coca crop cultivation, yet, cocaine 
prices remained stable. Some believed narco- traffickers were using previously saved stock piles 
of drugs to counter the crop reduction. However, crop productivity per hectare had increased 
due to genetically modified coca plants and improved planting techniques, resulting in a stable
Terrorism & Drug Prices 9
supply despite government predictions. In addition, narco- farmers simply changed growing 
locations to avoid aerial spraying and planted their illicit crops sporadically throughout licit 
crops to prevent detection. Arguments against these counternarcotic policies exist, citing that a 
reduction in supply will bolster prices, in turn leading to more production. Others question the 
effectiveness of development programs designed to encourage farmers to cultivate alternative 
licit crops because the success of these programs is undermined by cocaine refiners who will 
likely increase the amount paid to farmers for their coca crop (Mejia and Posada, 2008). This 
adaptability is also present in poppy cultivation. According to the UN World Drug Report 
(2012), in 2010 a plant disease destroyed half of the opium crop in Afghanistan; however, the 
opium production has already returned to the 2009 production level. Supply shortages in the 
heroin market were experienced in 2010, resulting in a decrease in heroin purity. The supply 
shortage is attributed to the 2010 poppy plant disease, increased law enforcement along main 
narcotics trafficking routes, and increasing heroin demand in Asian markets. By 2011, the 
supply shortage had been reversed, due to illicit drug traffickers finding alternative routes that 
were not policed. In 2010, cocaine production is believed to have decreased. Since 2005, the 
production of cocaine in Colombia has been decreasing; however, increased cocaine production 
in Bolivia and Peru has compensated for the decrease in Colombia production. These examples 
show the adaptability of the illicit drug market and that despite government efforts, large profits 
are still obtainable.
2.4 Terrorism and Illicit Drugs
Bjornehead (2004) discusses how mostly organized crime groups capitalize on profits 
that can be made through narcotics trafficking; however, other groups stand to profit from the 
narcotics trade, as well. Numerous armed terrorist groups have profited from the illicit drug trade
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in the past. The term “narcoterrorism” was historically used to describe the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Columbia’s (FARC) use of drug revenue to finance their terrorist activities. 
“Narcoterrorism” is expanding to include other terrorist organizations involved in the drug trade. 
Scholars attribute the shift in funding sources to the decline in state-sponsored terrorism after the 
Cold War (Global Overview, 2002); although Acharya and Marwah (2010) argue that passive 
state sponsored terrorism still exists. Prior to the end of the Cold War era, many terrorist groups 
received funding from state governments, such as Hezbollah and Iran, which is still accused of 
participating in state sponsored terrorism. Terrorist groups were then left to find alternative 
funding in order to survive. After the September 11th, 2001, terror attacks, terrorist organizations 
had to again shift their funding sources due to the influx of counter terror financial regulations, 
some of which allow for the freezing of assets.
Groups that are known, or are speculated, to participate in the drug trade are as follows: 
Taliban, Al Qaeda, FARC, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hezbollah, Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), Kurdish Workers Party, (PKK), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU), Nepalese Insurgent Groups, Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Path”), and the Abu Sayyaf 
Group (ASG) (Hutchison and O’Malley, 2007). Most of these groups either cultivate illicit drug 
crops or are situated amongst minor and major drug trafficking routes. Ciluffo (2000) reports 
that terrorist groups benefit from taxing growers and/or traffickers in their regions of control; 
they may also sell drug crops themselves. Sometimes instead of receiving money as revenue, 
they barter for weapons (Global Overview, 2002). According to Hutchinson and O’Malley 
(2007), drug trafficking appears to be the largest source of funding for terrorists and organized 
crime groups. In addition to its viable revenue source, drug trafficking helps terrorists by creating 
or maintaining chaos and instability in their regions, which is important for maintaining control
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(Kleiman, 2004). Piazza (2011) finds that cocaine and opiate wholesale prices are significant 
forecasters of domestic and transnational terrorist events.
Some scholars are fearful of terrorist groups collaborating with organized crime groups 
(Dishman, 2005); however, others believe that their relationship is not sustainable (Hutchinson 
and O’Malley, 2007). Hutchinson and O’Malley (2007) argue that whenever terrorists and 
organized crime groups temporarily work together it is usually due to pressure from organized 
crime groups, meaning that organized crime groups who are already involved in drug trafficking 
initiate the relationship with the terrorist organizations and have the most control over the 
trafficking. They further assert that organized crime groups and terrorists have differing 
motivations; those being profit and the desire to remain unseen for organized crime, while 
terrorists are motivated by a political ideology and desire attention. These major differences and 
the potential for competition will likely make long term collaboration improbable. It is more 
likely that they will copy one another‘s techniques rather than collaborate. While Hutchinson and 
O’Malley (2007) believe that the organizational structure of terrorist organizations makes it 
difficult for organized crime groups and terrorist organizations to cooperate, Dishman (2005) 
argues that the removal of hierarchical structures within both terrorist organizations and criminal 
organizations (which Dishman refers to as a “Leaderless nexus” of networks) may result in long 
term collaboration between terrorists and organized crime. Acharya and Marwah (2010) argue 
that terrorist organizations are not leaderless; they are well organized and pursue sophisticated 
terror plots. Hutchinson and O’Malley (2007) note that sometimes terror organizations turn into 
organized crime groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and FARC.
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3. Empirical Model
Regression analysis is used to calculate the relationship between illicit drug prices and 
terrorism. According to Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2010) the nature of terrorism can differ 
depending on whether it is a domestic or transnational terrorist attack. For the purpose of this 
research, domestic terrorist events and transnational terrorist events are dependent variables in 
my model. Data limitations exist for both terrorism data and illicit drug data. The nature of 
secrecy required to successfully carry-out terrorist events and sell illicit drugs makes data scarce. 
Terrorism data is referred to as count data and has limited variability, because it cannot 
accurately reflect all ‘planned’ terrorist events that never happened.
3.1 Initial Regression
The initial regression examines the relationship between illicit drug prices and terrorist 
events by region of attack; therefore for the purposes of this research, terrorist data is aggregated 
by year and region. Table 3 represents the domestic terrorist event data aggregated by year in 
which the event took place and the region where the attack happened from 1981-2007. Table 4 
displays the transnational terrorist event data aggregated by year and region of attack from 1981- 
2007. Table 2 represents the annual U.S. illicit drug prices at the dealer level. Table 5 exhibits 
the summary statistics of the terrorist event data and illicit drug price data. The summary 
statistics encapsulate the maximum and minimum values, the total number of observations used, 
the mean value, standard deviation and skewness of the data based by variable.
If illicit drug revenue is increasingly used as additional revenue source for terrorist 
organizations it is believed that an increase in both heroin and cocaine prices will increase
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terrorist funds. An increase in funds will likely result in increased terrorist attacks; therefore it is 
hypothesized that the coefficients of heroin and cocaine prices will be positive.
According to Kleiman (2004), participation in the illicit drug market allows terrorist 
organizations to earn cash as a revenue source and to create ‘chaos’ in the area surrounding their 
location. The chaos and instability in their areas is a result and/or cause of failed governments. 
Dummy variables based on location of attacks were included in the theoretical model. The 
following regions were chosen due to frequency of attack. (For domestic attacks: South America, 
South Asia, Middle East and North Africa; Transnational attacks: South America, Western 
Europe, Middle East and North Africa).These locations are also producers of plant-based illicit 
drug coca and opium crops. The North American dummy variable is included to measure the 
relationship between U.S. drug prices and North American terrorist incidents. North America is 
one of the largest consumers of illicit drugs; therefore, it is predicted that the coefficient of North 
American terrorist attacks is positive in relation to U.S. illicit drug prices (refer to Table 1 for 
expected coefficients).
The following regressions are used:
Domestic Terrorist Events
DOMESTIC TERRORISM (DOM) = β 0 + β1 U.S. COCAINE PRICE (PCOKE) +
β 2 NORTH AMERICAN DUMMY (DUMNA) + β 3 SOUTH AMERICA DUMMY 
(DUMSA) + p 4 SOUTH ASIA DUMMY (DUMSAS) + β 5 MIDDLE EAST & NORTH 
AFRICA DUMMY (DUMME)
DOMESTIC TERRORISM (DOM) = β0 + β1 U.S. HEROIN PRICE (PHER) + 
β 2 NORTH AMERICAN DUMMY (DUMNA) + β 3 SOUTH AMERICA DUMMY 
(DUMSA) + β 4 SOUTH ASIA DUMMY (DUMSAS) + β 5 MIDDLE EAST & NORTH 
AFRICA DUMMY (DUMME)
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Transnational Terrorist Events
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM (TRAN) = β0 + β1 U.S. COCAINE PRICE 
(PCOKE) + β 2 NORTH AMERICAN DUMMY (DUMNA) + β 3 SOUTH AMERICA 
DUMMY (DUMSA) + β 4 MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA DUMMY (DUMME) + 
β 5 WESTERN EUROPE DUMMY (DUMWEU)
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM (TRAN) = β0 + β1 U.S. HEROIN PRICE (PHER) + 
β 2 NORTH AMERICAN DUMMY (DUMNA) + β 3 SOUTH AMERICA DUMMY 
(DUMSA) + β 4 MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA DUMMY (DUMME) + β 5 
WESTERN EUROPE DUMMY (DUMWEU)
3.2 Expanded Regression
The regression is expanded in order to include independent variables for control purposes 
and to better address the effects of illicit drugs on terrorism in smaller areas, countries as 
opposed to regions. For the purpose of the expanded regression, terrorist events (both domestic 
and transnational) are sorted by country of attack and year from 1984- 2007; excluding terrorist 
events from 1993 (refer to Table 11). Terrorist events that took place in 1993 are excluded from 
the dataset because the 1993 data was lost in transport. Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2010) 
try to correct for this missing year of data; however, I decide to exclude this year. Table 11 
represents the annual U.S. illicit drug prices at the dealer level for cocaine and heroin from 1984- 
2007. Nine independent variables are added as control variables, meaning that these variables are 
used to account for other variables that may influence terrorist events. The following variables 
are used as control variables: natural log of gross national income per capita, natural log of 
population, and natural log of area. Other control variables are indexes provided by the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG): corruption, external conflict, internal conflict, law and 
order, political riskiness, and socioeconomic conditions (refer to Table 12 for specifics).
Previous research suggests that a country’s level of corruption, conflict, governance, and 
socioeconomic conditions may affect terrorist events. Kleiman (2004) asserts that illicit drugs
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create chaos in the areas of illicit drug production, due to increased opportunities for corruption, 
conflict, and ineffective governance. Table 13 presents an example of the panel data used for two 
countries, Colombia and the United Kingdom. The summary statistics for all of the variables 
used are listed in Tables 14 and 15.
I expect the following independent variables to have a positive coefficient: price of cocaine 
(PCOKE), price of heroin (PHER), natural log of gross national income per capita 
(LOGGNIPC), natural log of population (LOGPOP), and natural log of area (LOGAREA). If 
terrorists use illicit drug sales as revenue it is hypothesize that as the price of illicit drugs 
increases, terrorist events will increase. I hypothesize that the higher the gross national income 
per capita the more likely the country is to experience terrorist attacks. Domestically, it could be 
the result of dissatisfaction with large income gaps and transnationally due to terrorists attacking 
more powerful, wealthier nations, in order to receive media attention. I also hypothesize that the 
larger the physical area and population of the country, the more likely the country is to 
experience terrorist attacks, because there are more people to commit attacks and more possible 
targets.
I expect the six ICRG index variables to have a negative coefficient. The higher the country 
score, the better the country is in terms of the indexes. For example, if country A scores a 0 and 
country B scores 12 for internal conflict, country A has very high risk of internal conflict and 
country B has very low risk of internal conflict (please refer to Table 11 for index specifics). 
Again, these variables control for possible additional factors of terrorist events other than illicit 
drug prices (refer to Table 10 for a complete list of expected coefficients)
Terrorism & Drug Prices 16
The following regressions are used for the expanded version:
Domestic Terrorist Events
DOMESTIC TERRORISM (DOM) = β0 + β1 U.S. COCAINE PRICE (PCOKE) + β 2 
LOG GROSS NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA (LOGGNIPC) + β 3 LOG 
POPULATION (LOGPOP) + β 4 LOG LAND AREA (LOGAREA) + β 5 
CORRUPTION (COR) + β 6 EXTERNAL CONFLICT (EXT) + β 7 INTERNAL 
CONFLICT (INT) + β 8 LAW AND ORDER (LAO) + β 9 POLITICAL RISKINESS 
(POL) + β 10 SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS (SOC)
DOMESTIC TERRORISM (DOM) = β0 + β1 U.S. HEROIN PRICE (PHER) + β 2 LOG 
GROSS NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA (LOGGNIPC) + β3 LOG POPULATION 
(LOGPOP) + β 4 LOG LAND AREA (LOGAREA) + β 5 CORRUPTION (COR) + β 6 
EXTERNAL CONFLICT (EXT) + β 7 INTERNAL CONFLICT (INT) + β 8 LAW AND 
ORDER (LAO) + β 9 POLITICAL RISKINESS (POL) + β10 SOCIOECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS (SOC)
Transnational Terrorist Events
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM (TRAN) = β0 + β1 U.S. COCAINE PRICE 
(PCOKE) + β 2 LOG GROSS NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA (LOGGNIPC) + β 3 
LOG POPULATION (LOGPOP) + β 4 LOG LAND AREA (LOGAREA) + β 5 
CORRUPTION (COR) + β 6 EXTERNAL CONFLICT (EXT) + β 7 INTERNAL 
CONFLICT (INT) + β 8 LAW AND ORDER (LAO) + β 9 POLITICAL RISKINESS 
(POL) + β 10 SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS (SOC)
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM (TRAN) = β0 + β1 U.S. HEROIN PRICE (PHER) + 
β 2 LOG GROSS NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA (LOGGNIPC) + β 3 LOG 
POPULATION (LOGPOP) + β 4 LOG LAND AREA (LOGAREA) + β 5 
CORRUPTION (COR) + β 6 EXTERNAL CONFLICT (EXT) + β 7 INTERNAL 
CONFLICT (INT) + β 8 LAW AND ORDER (LAO) + β 9 POLITICAL RISKINESS 
(POL) + β10 SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS (SOC)
4. Presentation and Analysis of Data
Both the initial regression and expanded regression’s results calculate similar results in terms 
of illicit drug prices. The expanded regression corrects for some limitations of the initial
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regression by including additional control variables and sorting terrorist event data by country, 
instead of by region. According to both regressions, cocaine price has a positive coefficient for 
both domestic and transnational terrorist events; however, these coefficients are not statistically 
significant. Heroin price has a positive coefficient for both domestic and transnational terrorist 
events and is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level for domestic terrorist events and 
transnational terrorist events.
4.1 Initial Regression Results
Four separate regressions are used to measure the relationship between the dependent 
variables of domestic terrorist events or transnational terrorist events and the listed independent 
variables: price of cocaine (PCOKE), price of heroin (PHER), North American region 
(DUMNA), South American region (DUMSA), South Asia region (DUMSAS), Middle East and 
North African region (DUMME), and Western Europe (DUMWEU) (see also Table 1). Heroin 
and cocaine prices are used in separate regressions in order to avoid multicollinearity issues, due 
to the high correlation between drug prices (refer to Tables 6 and 7). The U.S. illicit drug price 
data represents the average prices of cocaine and heroin at the dealer level from 1981-2007; in 
2007 dollars (refer to Table 2). The terrorism datasets for domestic and transnational terrorism 
from 1981-2007 are provided by Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2010). The terrorism datasets 
are aggregated by year and region prior to running regressions (refer to Tables 3 and 4). Dummy 
variables are used to represent regions in which terrorist attacks occurred. Refer to graph 1 for 
representation of different regions.
Overall, as previously hypothesized, most of the independent variables have positive 
coefficients except for the North American dummy variable DUMNA (refer to Table 8). All
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other dummy regional independent variables were significant (refer to Table 8). Both 
coefficients for cocaine PCOKE and heroin PHER prices are positive; however, cocaine price 
PCOKE is not statistically significant in any regressions. Heroin price PHER is significant at the 
95% confidence level in the domestic terrorist event regression model and statistically significant 
at the 90% confidence level in the transnational terrorist event regression model (refer to Table 
8). Illicit drug prices have a stronger relationship with domestic terrorist events than 
transnational terrorist events, which is evident by PHER’s larger and more statistically 
significant coefficient in the domestic terrorist event regression model (refer to Table 8).
Domestic Terrorist Event Regression Results
When analyzing both domestic terrorist event regression results, three regional variables 
(DUMSA, DUMSAS, DUMME) have positive coefficients and are significant at the 100% 
confidence level. These results are not surprising because these regions were chosen based on the 
frequency of attacks; however, two of these regions are major producers of illicit drug crops, 
South America grows coca bush and South Asia grows poppy plants. The Middle East and 
North African region is an active area for terrorist attacks. While illicit drug crops are not 
produced on a large-scale in this region, it is possible that terrorist organizations in drug crop 
producing regions or organized crime groups trafficking narcotics are partnering with Middle 
Eastern/North African terrorist organizations. Further analysis is needed to empirically test the 
reasons why these areas are more prone to attacks. Although PCOKE and PHER are highly 
correlated (refer to Tables 6 and 7), PCOKE is not statistically significant, while PHER is 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. It is unclear as to why PCOKE is not 
statistically significant while PHER is statistically significant in relation to domestic terrorist
events.
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Transnational Terrorist Event Regression Results
The regression results for transnational terrorist events are slightly different than the 
domestic terrorist events regression results. Three dummy region variables (DUMSA, DUMME, 
and DUMWEU) have positive coefficients and are significant at the 100% confidence level 
(refer to Table 8). Again, these results are not surprising because these three regions were chosen 
because they experienced the most transnational attacks; however, South America DUMSA does 
produce the coca bush. Further empirical analysis is needed to determine why Western Europe 
DUMWEU and the Middle East and North Africa DUMME are frequent targets for transnational 
attacks. Cocaine price PCOKE and heroin price PHER have positive coefficients; however, they 
are not statistically significant.
The coefficient for the North American region DUMNA was opposite of its hypothesized 
value for both domestic and transnational terrorist event regressions. Originally, it was 
hypothesized that DUMNA would have a positive coefficient; however, it was negative in every 
regression, although never statistically significant (refer to Table 8). Enders and Sandler (2006) 
argue that increased counterterrorism policies or defensive measures cause transference in 
attacks, whether it is type of attack or location of attack. Assuming that terrorists are rational 
actors, the terrorists will choose a weaker-link or ‘soft-target’ to attack if they believe that 
attacking a certain target is too costly or risky. For instance, if a country employs larger amounts 
of counterterrorism, relative to other countries, they will be better at deterring terrorist attacks as 
opposed to a country that does not enact counterterrorism policies or enacts fewer policies. The 
regressions in this research paper do not control for or measure transference; therefore, further 
empirical analysis is needed to measure U.S. counterterrorism policies and terrorist events.
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Expanded Regression Results
Four separate regressions are used to calculate the relationship between terrorist events 
and the following independent variables: price of cocaine (PCOKE), price of heroin (PHER), 
natural log of gross national income per capita (LOGGNIPC), natural log of population 
(LOGPOP), natural log of land area (LOGAREA), corruption (COR), external conflict (EXT), 
internal conflict (INT), law and order (LAO), political riskiness (POL), and socioeconomic 
conditions (SOC). Due to multicollinearity issues, cocaine and heroin prices are measured in 
separate regressions. The expanded regression uses U.S. illicit drug prices for cocaine and heroin 
at the dealer level from 1984-2007, in 2007 dollars (refer to Tablel 1). Enders, Sandler, and 
Gaibulloev (2010) provide the terrorism datasets separated into domestic and transnational 
terrorist attacks. Only terrorist event data from 1984-2007 (excluding 1993 events) are used in 
the regression. Prior to running the regression, the terrorist event data is aggregated by country of 
attack and year (refer to Table 13 for an example).
In general, most independent variables have the expected coefficients; however, the 
coefficients and statistical significance changed across the model contingent to the dependent 
variable and illicit drug price being tested. Several independent variables’ coefficients are 
opposite of the originally expected sign and are statistically significant. Overall, cocaine prices 
have a positive coefficient for both domestic and transnational terrorist events, but are not 
statistically significant. Heroin prices have a positive coefficient and are statistically significant 
when tested with domestic and transnational terrorist events (refer to Table 18).
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Domestic Terrorist Event Regression Results
The price of cocaine (PCOKE) has a positive coefficient, but is not statistically 
significant when tested with domestic terrorist events. Heroin price (PHER) has a positive 
coefficient and is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. It is unclear why heroin is 
statistically significant while cocaine is not statistically significant. A possible explanation for 
these results is that terrorist groups situated along heroin trafficking routes or cultivating poppy 
plants could be more violent and active in terms of terrorist events, as opposed to terror groups 
involved in cocaine trafficking and production. It is also possible that groups who are in the 
cocaine illicit drug trade identify as an organized crime group instead of a terrorist organization. 
As an organized crime group, their motivations and actions would be profit driven and thus, not 
against a particular group or ideology, commonly seen in terrorism. Further analysis is needed to 
test these interpretations.
Several independent variables being used as control variables are opposite of their 
expected coefficients and are statistically significant (refer to Table 10 for expected coefficients). 
The natural log of the land area (LOGAREA) has a negative coefficient, but is not statistically 
significant. When tested with the price of heroin, political riskiness (POL) has a positive 
coefficient, but is not statistically significant. Corruption (COR) not only has a positive 
coefficient, but is statistically significant. A potential explanation could be that while the 
domestic government is not extremely corrupt, some within that country that would benefit from 
destabilizing the country. These individuals or groups would be desperate to try violent means, 
since bribing officials is not a viable option. External conflict (EXT) also has a positive 
coefficient and is statistically significant. A conceivable reason for this relationship is that a 
government may be better at dealing with foreign governments than meeting the needs of their
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own citizens. In essence, a state could be manipulated as a ‘puppet’ of foreign government(s), at 
the expense of its own citizenry. Further research is needed to test these deductions.
Transnational Terrorist Event Regression Results
As hypothesized cocaine price (PCOKE) has a positive coefficient, but is not a 
statistically significant. Heroin price (PHER) has a positive coefficient and is significant at the 
90% confidence interval. Again, it is unclear why heroin is statistically significant, while cocaine 
is not statistically significant. A possible explanation is that terrorist groups who may be 
benefiting from heroin trafficking are more active and/or more violent than groups who are 
benefiting from cocaine trafficking. Additional research is needed to test this presumption.
Two independent variables used as control variables have the opposite signs than 
previously expected and are statistically significant. The natural log of land area has a negative 
coefficient, but is not statistically significant. Corruption (COR) has a positive coefficient and is 
statistically significant. A probable explanation for this relationship is that a non-corrupt country 
could be targeted by foreign nations and individuals who could be jealous of the non-corrupt 
government and frustrated with their government. There are numerous reasons as to why a 
foreign entity may target a sound government, which is likely a stronger government. External 
conflict (EXT) has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant. It could be reasoned that 
the easiest target for a transnational attack would be a state that has the least risk of external 
conflict. It is likely that a fairly peaceful government may be unsuspecting of a foreign attack. 
Also, a peaceful government may be a popular foreign tourist attraction due to its perceived 
safety. Popular tourist locations that are relatively unguarded are the perfect targets for terrorists 
wanting global attention. Further research is needed to test these theories.
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A limitation of the expanded regression is the issue of multicollinearity. Several independent 
variables are highly correlated with one another (refer to Tables 16 and 17). Despite the high 
correlations, it was important to include each variable not only as a control, but to also scrutinize 
Kleiman (2004) argument that illicit drugs will contribute to corruption and eventual government 
failure.
Overall, significant limitations, including data limitations and the inability to control for 
counterterrorism/counter narcotic measures, are issues that can affect the validity of this 
research. The regional classifications are drastically different in size geographically and in terms 
of population that should be standardized (refer to Table 9). Data on emerging illicit drug 
markets, where narcotic prices have not stabilized, is nonexistent. It is possible that terrorist 
organizations are gaining a higher amount of revenue from emerging markets, not the mature 
Western markets. In addition, the timing of carrying out terrorist attacks can differ depending on 
the terrorist organization or by attack type; therefore, it is difficult to accurately state that high 
drug revenues will result in higher amounts of terrorism in the short-run. Terrorists can also use 
drug revenues to fund non-violent means of their organizations, not only violent means. Lastly, it 
is difficult to measure which ‘terrorist’ events are spillovers from regional conflicts or other 
historical reasons. These limitations should be addressed in future research endeavors.
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Regression results indicate that U.S. heroin prices are statistically significant positive 
predictors of domestic and transnational terrorist events. The regressions further illustrate that 
U.S. cocaine prices are positive forecasters for domestic and transnational terrorism, and U.S. 
heroin prices are positive predictors of transnational terrorist events; however, these results are
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not statistically significant. Certain regions are statistically significant positive predictors of 
domestic terrorist events (South America, South Asia, and Middle East/North Africa), while 
other regions are statistically significant positive predictors of transnational terrorist event 
locations (South America, Middle East/North Africa, and Western Europe). The North American 
region is a negative predictor of both domestic and transnational terrorist attacks; however, this 
finding is not statistically significant. As the saying goes, correlation does not prove causation. 
While terrorist events and illicit drug prices have decreased over the past several decades it is 
uncertain as to what definitely caused the decrease in both.
The expanded regression results also find that U.S. heroin prices are statistically 
significant positive predictors of domestic and transnational terrorist events; however, U.S. 
cocaine prices are not statistically significant positive predictors. Statistically significant control 
variables also provide further information on other factors that are correlated with terrorist 
events. These control variables relate to the theories of the multiple benefits of the drug-terrorism 
nexus. Kleiman (2004) asserts that terrorists benefit from narco-trafficking by receiving cash 
and creating chaos, which allows for increased corruption. According to the results, the less 
corrupt a country is, the more likely it will have either a domestic or transnational terrorist attack. 
Future research would be needed to determine whether or not corruption is a catalyst for 
increased terrorism or a result of increased terrorism.
Terrorists and narcotraffickers are constantly improving and perfecting their operations in 
spite of continuous government efforts to thwart their activities. If terrorist organizations are 
receiving funding from narcotrafficking, government officials could promote a more targeted 
counternarcotic approach for certain regions or certain parts of the illicit drug supply chain. It is 
argued that drug traffickers and terrorist organizations operate similarly to large corporate
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companies. It would perhaps be most beneficial to eliminate the most profitable parts to the 
supply chain for these illicit businesses.
The policy implications of these findings suggest that counterterrorism policies should 
continue including counter narcotic policies in order to effectively combat domestic terrorism in 
regions where domestic terrorism occurs frequently. It is likely that reducing domestic terrorism 
in these breeding grounds of terrorism will result in a decrease of international terrorism, 
especially if transnational terrorism is a spillover of domestic terrorist events as some scholars 
suggest. If policy makers are looking to reduce costs of counterterrorism policies, they should 
focus counter narcotic efforts more so on opium crops and not cocaine crops only in the short- 
run. Once policies are aimed at opium producers, they will switch to other illicit activities that 
will generate revenue.
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Table 1
Variables U sed
Domestic Expected Sign of Coefficient
Heroin Prices




Middle East and North Africa +
Cocaine Prices +
North America +
South America                           +
South Asia +
Middle East and North Africa +
Transnational
Heroin Prices
                          +
Nath America                           +
South America +
Western Europe +





Middle East and North Africa +
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Table 2
A verage P r ice  o f  C o c a in e  an d  H eroin  in th e U n ited  S tates
(1 9 8 1 -2 0 0 7 )  fo r  p u rch a ses  at th e d ealer lev el





























1Cocaine “dealer” level-purchases of 10-50 grains.
2Heroin “dealer”  level- purchases greater than 1 gram, up to 10 grams.
Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy (July 2008). The Price 
and Purity o f Illicit Drugs: 1981-2007. Washington, DC: Executive 
Office of the President. R epot prepared by the Institute for Defense 
Analyses for ONDCP.
Table 3































1981 7 625 246 1 30 14 0 196 0 175 73 0 1 1368
1982 25 531 430 2 30 14 0 141 0 149 39 0 1 1362
1983 12 296 642 4 11 48 0 170 0 108 76 0 0 1367
1984 35 273 1166 6 28 171 0 224 2 70 90 0 1 2066
1985 19 332 737 8 67 95 0 172 0 61 99 0 3 1593
1986 15 187 714 6 44 116 0 127 0 66 145 0 1 1421
1987 14 314 918 9 78 239 0 135 0 99 135 0 4 1945
1988 9 333 733 16 145 567 0 291 0 122 274 0 2 2492
1989 17 277 1077 13 125 611 0 271 4 239 207 5 18 2864
1990 17 210 795 84 218 390 0 214 15 265 351 23 8 2590
1991 14 374 948 11 118 399 0 377 14 289 157 13 8 2722
1992 50 141 889 62 176 350 15 447 24 728 282 49 8 3221
1993 6 3 52 1 7 28 0 108 0 88 11 2 0 306
1994 68 101 250 22 64 234 14 192 13 578 188 69 5 1798
1995 53 84 138 25 100 564 11 74 13 391 85 42 6 1586
1997 63 69 354 67 97 375 15 115 50 223 89 51 9 1577
1997 9 2 70 456 27 114 259 14 116 78 337 165 43 5 1776
1998 31 1 752 22 104 8 101 19 134 44 29 1 571
1999 10 1 43 1 37 130 9 72 2 124 43 28 3 503
2000 9 2 59 12 115 168 4 115 6 118 51 63 0 722
2001 29 0 95 4 116 216 2 126 45 192 62 77 1 965
2002 5 1 731 55 165 0 55 7 157 35 51 0 605
2003 11 8 76 2 96 224 0 65 10 120 22 50 1 685
2004 3 4 28 0 48 210 3 28 0 172 15 27 0 538
2005 4 2 30 0 106 288 2 45 1 297 25 37 0 837
2006 6 3 332 160 452 2 47 3 560 50 23 1 1342
2007 11 2 33 0 263 507 1 27 1 831 125 41 1 1843
Grand T o tal 635 4244 11090 388 2470 6938 100 4051 307 6693 2938 723 88 40665
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Table 4


































1981 29 100 5 8 3 5 4 0 173 4 67 11 0 2 4 5 6
1982 22 73 6 2 1 3 5 0 132 2 52 13 0 1 3 6 6
1983 4 61 9 4 4 6 11 0 162 1 55 13 0 0 4 1 1
1984 7 36 66 4 3 8 0 192 1 78 21 0 8 4 2 4
1 9 8 5 7 40 91 2 7 12 0 152 1 53 10 0 4 3 7 9
1986 4 14 112 3 13 24 0 140 0 49 9 0 4 3 7 2
1987 _________ 1 29 82 0 12 13 0 127 0 44 18 0 0 3 2 6
1988 0 24 85 5 2 6 23 0 73 0 44 19 0 4 3 0 3
1989 2 35 130 3 2 0 37 0 60 3 57 2 7 0 10 3 8 4
1990 2 22 148 4 52 41 0 68 3 35 3 3 3 6 4 1 7
1991 9 54 164 5 2 6 114 0 199 30 134 3 3 18 2 7 88
1992 5 38 133 10 51 55 5 2 01 32 106 9 0 9 6 741
1993 1 3 17 1 6 18 1 53 3 55 12 3 0 173
1994 11 4 8 76 10 6 2 27 4 2 56 15 112 9 3 11 7 7 32
1 9 9 5 8 32 3 9 7 34 37 3 2 2 8 8 40 6 5 14 8 5 2 3
1 9 9 6 16 36 56 15 4 6 38 5 304 14 40 37 14 4 6 2 5
1997 34 29 182 6 2 7 20 11 179 58 54 3 8 33 3 6 7 4
1 9 9 8 0 3 13 5 6 8 2 26 23 27 17 6 0 136
1999 1 2 27 0 11 18 1 62 34 24 21 8 0 2 0 9
2 0 0 0 0 0 13 122 16 2 25 29 13 2 0 2 1 144
20 0 1 1 0 11 2 14 7 0 21 25 13 14 1 1 1 10
2002 1 0 4 1 11 23 1 19 4 26 9 3 0 102
2 0 0 3 0 0 11 1 5 58 0 29 4 53 9 1 2 173
2004 0 0 0 0 6 41 2 7 0 113 1 l 0 171
2 0 0 5 0 0 11 07 53 0 25 7 92 6 2 0 2 0 3
2 0 0 6 1 0 6 0 15 88 0 39 6 121 4 5 70 3 2 8
2 0 0 7 1 0 3 0 6 63 0 28 4 6 9 55 2 0 2 31
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Table 5
Summary Statistics- Initial Regression
Aggregates by year









351 366.704 204.023 0.661 102 788 9901
U.S. Heroin Prices 
(PHER)
27 727.106 511.695 0.813 222.760 1795.72 27
U.S. Cocaine Prices 
(PCOKE)
27 104.001 81.144 1.783 39.110 327.15 27
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Table 6
Domestic Correlations
DOM PCOKE PHER DUMNA DUMSA DUMSAS DUMME
DOM 1.0000 0.0304 0.1234 -0.1422 0.4540 0.2172 0.2033
PCOKE 0.0304 1.0000 0.8867 3.64E-17 -1.23E-17 4.89E-18 -1.66E-17
PHER 0.1234 0.8867 1.0000 1.24E-17 -6.96E-18 3.33E-18 -3.24E-17
DUMNA -0.1422 3.64E-17 1.24E-17 1.0000 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833
DUMSA 0.4540 -1.23E-17 -6.96E-18 -0.0833 1.0000 -0.0833 -0.0833
DUMSAS 0.2172 4.89E-18 3.33E-18 -0.0833 -0.0833 1.0000 -0.0833
DUMME 0.2033 -1.66E-17 -3.24E-17 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 1.0000
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Table 7
Transnational Correlations
TRAN PCOKE PHER DUMNA DUMSA DUMME DUMWEU
TRAN 1.0000 0.0505 0.1028 -0.1427 0.2237 0.2074 0.5322
PCOKE 0.0505 1.0000 0.8867 3.64E-17 -1.23E-17 -8.35E-19 2.50E-18
PHER 0.1028 0.8867 1.0000 1.24E-17 -6.96E-18 6.35E-18 -8.17E-18
DUMNA -0.1427 3.64E-17 1.24E-17 1.0000 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833
DUMSA 0.2237 -1.23E-17 -6.96E-18 -0.0833 1.0000 -0.0833 -0.0833
DUMME 0.2074 -8.35E-19 6.35E-18 -0.0833 -0.0833 1.0000 -0.0833
DUMWEU 0.5322 2.50E-18 -8.17E-18 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 1.0000
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Table 8
I n i t i a l  R e g r e s s i o n  R e s u l t s
β  C o e f f ic ie n ts
1 2 3 4
V a r ia b le D o m e s t i c D o m e s t i c T r a n s n a t io n a l T r a n s n a t io n a l
P C O K E 0 .0 7 - 0 .0 3 -
P H E R - 0 .0 5 * * - 0 .0 1 *
D U M N A -3 9 .4 8 -3 9 .4 8 -7 .9 5 -7 .9 5
D U M S A 3 4 7 . 7 4 * * * 3 4 7 .7 4 * * * 4 8 .6 1 * * * 4 8 .6 1 * * *
D U M S A S 193 . 9 6 * * * 1 9 3 .9 6 * * * - -
D U M M E 1 8 4 .8 9 * * * 1 8 4 .8 9 * * * 4 6 .0 9 * * * 4 6 .0 9 * * *
D U M W E U - - 9 6 .2 4 * * * 9 6 .2 4 * * *
R 2 0 .3 5 0 .3 6 0 .4 4 0 .4 5
A d ju s te d  R 2 0 .3 4 0 .3 5 0 .4 3 0 .4 4
N o te s :  * α = .1 0 ; * * α = .0 5 ;  * * * α = .0 1
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Table 9
Regions
North America Canada. Mexico. St Pierre and Miquelon. United States
Central America and Caribbean Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda 
Bonaire (Netherlands Antilles), Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba 
Curacao (Netherlands Andies), Dominica Dominican Rep title, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala Haiti Honduras Jamaica, 
Martinique, Montserrat, Nicaragua Panama Puerto Rico, Saba 
(Netherlands Amies), Sint Eustatius (Netherlands Andies), Sint 
Maarten (Netherlands Antilles)  St. Barthelemy, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia St. Martin, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Turks and Caicos Virgin Islands (British) Virgin Islands (U.S.)
South America Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador, Falkland Islands, 
French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surname, Uruguay, Venezuela
East Asia China Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongola, North Korea Souh Korea, 
Taiwan, Tibet
Southeast Asia Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Vietnam, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam
South  Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India Maldives, Mauritius, Nepal 
Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka
Central Asia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Western Europe Andorra Austria, Belgium, Corsica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Gibraltar, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Man, Isle of Monaco, Netherlands, Northern 
Ireland, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Vatican City, West Germany (FRG)
Eastern Europe Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany (GDR), Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Serbia-Montenegro, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Yugoslavia
Middle East and North Africa Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, I ran, Iraq, Israel Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
South Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, Western Sahara, Yemen
Sub-Saharan Africa Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Repubic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), 
Congo (Kinshasa), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rhodesia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Russia and the Newly Independent States Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, 
Soviet Union, Ukraine
Australasia and Oceania Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa (Western Samoa), Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna
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Table 10
Variables Used- Expanded Regression
Domestic Expected Sign of Coefficient
Cocaine price +
Heroin price +
Log of Gross National Income Per Capita +
Log of Population +










Log of Gross National Income Per Capita +
Log of Population +




Law and Order -
Political Riskiness -
Socioeconomic Conditions -
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Table 11
Average Price of Cocaine and Heroin in the United States
(1984-2007) for purchases at the dealer level






























Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy (July 2008). The Price 
and Purity o f Illicit Drugs: 1981-2007. Washington, DC: Executive 
Office of the President. Report prepared by the Institute for Defense 
Analyses for ONDCP.
1Cocaine “dealer" level-purchases of 10-50 grams.
2Heroin “dealer” level- purchases greater than 1 gram, up to 10 grams.
Terrorism & Drug Prices 37
Table 12
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data
Variable Description Index
6 pt. Index (0= Very High Risk, 6= 
Very Low Risk)
12 pt. Index (0= Very High Risk, 
12= Very Low Risk)
Corruption Corruption within the political system 0-6







Internal Conflict Measure of political violence and its 
impact on governance. Three 
subcomponents:




Law and Order Law- strength and impartiality of legal 
system
Order- popular observance of law
0-6
Political Riskiness Subcomponents and Max. Points: 
Government Stability 12
0-100
Socioeconomic Conditions 12 0- 49.9 = Very High Risk
Investment Profile 12 50- 59.9 = High Risk
Internal Conflict 12 60- 69.9 = M oderate Risk
External Conflict 12 70- 79.9 = Low Risk
Corruption 6 
Military in Politics 6 
Religious Tensions 6 
Law and Order 6 
Ethnic Tensions 6 
Democratic Accountability6 
Bureaucracy Quality 4
80 -100 = Very Low Risk
Socioeconomic Conditions Socioeconomic pressures a t work and 
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Table 13
Panel Data Aggregation Example
Year DOM Events PCOKE PHER Log GNI pc Log POP Log Area COR EXT INT LAO POL SOC
Colombia
1984 120 197.21 1634.64 7.154615 17.19513 13.91942 3 9 8 2 64 6
1985 235 197.73 1326.64 7.098376 17.21649 13.91942 3 9 5 1 59 6
1986 174 151.04 1202.41 7.114769 17.23752 13.91942 3 9 5 1 58 6
1987 235 114.07 1206.14 7.130899 17.2582 13.91942 3 8 4 1 56 7
1988 262 85.32 985.05 7.17012 17.27853 13.91942 3 8 4 1 50 5
1989 369 77.55 786.14 7.138867 17.29852 13.91942 3 10 5 1 53 5
1990 234 98.13 1005.35 7.138867 17.31816 13.91942 3 10 5 1 58 7
1991 278 77.99 943.26 7.114769 17.33745 13.91942 3 10 5 1 60 7
1992 392 72.19 700.26 7.185387 17.35639 13.91942 3 12 5 1 58 7
1994 136 64.46 471.44 7.489971 17.3934 13.91942 3 12 7 2 62 7
1995 68 67.19 449.12 7.696213 17.41154 13.91942 3 10 7 2 59 7
1996 276 58.75 420.53 7.835975 17.42947 13.91942 2 9 7 2 53 5
1997 363 60.6 362.43 7.882315 17.44716 13.91942 1 9 2 2 47 2
1998 64 55.02 327.39 7.847763 17.46459 13.91942 2 9 3 2 49 2
1999 38 58.05 297.18 7.749322 17.4817 13.91942 2 9 4 2 48 2
2000 56 63.97 299.88 7.762171 17.49848 13.91942 2 9 6 1 49 2
2001 85 62.47 270.39 7.749322 17.5149 13.91942 2 7.5 3.5 1 50.5 4
2002 67 54.9 270.31 7.766417 17.53099 13.91942 3 7.5 3 1 53 4
2003 67 51.89 264.56 7.762171 17.54678 13.91942 3 8.5 3.5 1 53.5 4
2004 23 48.22 297.02 7.859413 17.56232 13.91942 3 8.5 6 1 59 4.5
2005 30 42.8 253.8 7.986165 17.57765 13.91942 3 8.5 5.5 1 56.5 3.5
2006 28 39.11 265.32 8.143227 17.59278 13.91942 2.5 8.5 5.5 1.5 57 3
2007 20 48.32 222.76 8.311398 17.60768 13.91942 2.5 8 5.5 1.5 56.5 3
United Kingdom
1984 53 197.21 1634.64 9.021598 17.84837 12.3964 6 10 11 5 86 9
1985 25 197.73 1326.64 9.006999 17.85064 12.3964 6 10 11 4 81 8
1986 17 151.04 1202.41 9.124782 17.85296 12.3964 6 10 11 4 78 7
1987 42 114.07 1206.14 9.338734 17.85508 12.3964 6 10 11 4 85 9
1988 88 85.32 985.05 9.574983 17.8573 12.3964 5 12 10 4 84 8
1989 80 77.55 786.14 9.651816 17.85991 12.3964 5 12 10 5 79 8
1990 73 98.13 1005.35 9.717158 17.8629 12.3964 5 9 9 5 76 6
1991 187 77.99 943.26 9.754407 17.86599 12.3964 5 12 10 5 77 6
1992 200 72.19 700.26 9.851141 17.86869 12.3964 5 12 10 6 76 6
1994 41 64.46 471.44 9.866305 17.87364 12.3964 5 12 12 6 80 7
1995 2 67.19 449.12 9.884305 17.87628 12.3964 5 12 12 6 80 7
1996 3 58.75 420.53 9.941265 17.87883 12.3964 4 12 10 6 85 8
1997 6 60.6 362.43 10.00514 17.8814 12.3964 5 12 11 6 90 10
1998 55 55.02 327.39 10.0639 17.88432 12.3964 5 10 10 6 89 10
1999 33 58.05 297.18 10.11739 17.88765 12.3964 5 10 9 6 90 11
2000 22 63.97 299.88 10.16238 17.89122 12.3964 5 9 10 6 90 11
2001 49 62.47 270.39 10.16007 17.89488 12.3964 4.5 7.5 10.5 6 89 11
2002 9 54.9 270.31 10.17275 17.89855 12.3964 4.5 8.5 9 6 87 11
2003 18 51.89 264.56 10.2809 17.9026 12.3964 4.5 8.5 10 6 86.5 10.5
2004 3 48.22 297.02 10.45074 17.90765 12.3964 4.5 7 10 5.5 84 10.5
2005 15 42.8 253.8 10.57209 17.91359 12.3964 4.5 7 9.5 5.5 82.5 10
2006 2 39.11 265.32 10.62595 17.91973 12.3964 4 7 9.5 5.5 82 10
2007 9 48.32 222.76 10.70302 17.92617 12.3964 4 7 9.5 5.5 82 10
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Table 14
Summary Statistics Domestic Events
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Min. Max.
Domestic Terrorist 
Events (DOM) 1205 27.18 63.57 4.77 1 673
U.S. Cocaine Prices 
(PCOKE) 23 78.80 39.31 1.99 39.11 197.73
U.S. Heroin Prices 
(PHER) 23 626.78 388.03 0.91 222.76 1634.64




1205 7.72 1.56 0.21 4.25 11.14
Log of Population 
(LOGPOP) 1205 16.88 1.53 0.11 12.49 20.99
Log of Land Area 
(LOGAREA) 1205 12.77 1.79 -0.39 5.77 16.61
Corruption (COR) 1205 3.13 1.37 0.23 0.00 6.00
External Conflict 
(EXT) 1205 9.39 2.45 -1.03 0.00 12.00
Internal Conflict 
(INT) 1205 8.05 2.96 -0.59 0.00 12.00
Law and Order 
(LAO) 1205 3.51 1.57 0.00 0.00 6.00
Political Riskiness 
(POL) 1205 61.38 15.80 -0.16 15.00 97.00
Socioeconomic 
Conditions (SOC) 1205 5.59 2.14 0.07 0.00 11.00
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Table 15
Summary Statistics Transnational Events




988 6.90 15.04 6.70 1.00 223.00
U.S. Cocaine 
Prices (PCOKE) 23 81.30 40.49 1.87 39.11 197.73
U.S. Heroin 
Prices (PHER) 23 656.71 390.48 0.77 222.76 1634.64




988 7.74 1.56 0.17 4.38 10.99
Log of Population 
(LOGPOP) 988 16.92 1.47 0.14 12.57 20.96
Log of Land Area 
(LOGAREA) 988 12.76 1.76 -0.57 5.77 16.61
Corruption
(COR)
988 3.21 1.35 0.29 0.00 6.00
Extern al Conflict 
(EXT) 988 9.36 2.52 -1.03 0.00 12.00
Internal Conflict 
(INT) 988 7.94 3.03 -0.54 0.00 12.00
Law and Order 
(LAO) 988 3.50 1.57 -0.01 0.00 6.00
Political 
Riskiness (POL) 988 61.07 16.05 -0.14 13.00 94.00
Socioeconomic 
Conditions (SOC) 988 5.60 2.11 0.04 0.50 11.00
Table 16
DOM PCOKE PHER LOGGNIPC LOGPOP LOGAREA COR EXT INT LAO POL SOC
DOM 1.000000 0.114055 0.154808 -0.098817 0.167980 0.125005 -0.062175 -0.089277 -0.343180 -0.251446 -0.228787 -0.114288
PCOKE 0.114055 1.000000 0.897963 -0.063532 -0.114382 -0.053497 0.147597 -0.257371 -0.224646 -0.169500 -0.186106 0.040976
PHER 0.154808 0.897963 1.000000 -0.077272 -0.148489 •0.063049 0.199818 -0.278933 -0.271818 -0.224141 -0.247267 0.049964
LOGGNIPC -0.098817 -0.063532 -0.077272 1.000000 -0.032059 -0.127450 0.595541 0.354459 0.553971 0.672673 0.765370 0.665446
LOGPOP 0.167980 -0.114382 -0.148489 -0.032059 1.000000 0.692754 -0.092102 0.105163 0.039421 0.060026 0.070073 0.037566
LOGAREA 0.125005 -0.053497 -0.063049 -0.127450 0.692754 1.000000 -0.109933 0.069029 -0.048948 -0.066438 -0.043584 -0.075403
COR -0.062175 0.147597 0.199818 0595541 -0.092102 -0.109933 1.000000 0.279079 0.454952 0.598528 0.636338 0.503571
EXT -0.089277 -0.257371 -0.278933 0.354459 0.105163 0.069029 0.279079 1.000000 0.600661 0.450813 0.628274 0.303975
INT -0.343180 -0.224646 -0.271818 0.553971 0.039421 -0.048948 0.454952 0.600661 1.000000 0.762647 0.846888 0.487163
LAO -0.251446 -0.169500 -0.224141 0.672673 0.060026 -0.066438 0.598528 0.450813 0.762647 1.000000 0.833559 0.568284
POL -0.228787 -0.186106 -0.247267 0.765370 0.070073 -0.043584 0.636338 0.628274 0.846888 0.833559 1.000000 0.716897






TRAN PCOKE PHER LOGGNIPC LOGPOP LOGAREA COR EXT INT LAO POL SOC
TRAN 1.000000 0.044666 0.068705 0.092368 0.141460 0.078250 0.055830 0.072647 -0.060938 -0.007804 0.008571 0.005363
PCOKE 0.044666 1.000000 0.894435 -0.028421 -0.103764 -0.024463 0.144127 -0.257451 -0.217956 -0.155617 -0.166946 0.080407
PHER 0.068705 0.894435 1.000000 -0.035427 -0.152272 -0.059711 0.203168 -0.288391 -0.267051 -0.215125 -0.229745 0.084974
LOGGNIPC 0.092368 -0.028421 -0.035427 1.000000 -0.088412 -0.196689 0.594879 0.350320 0.554261 0.684951 0.753905 0.645154
LOGPOP 0.141460 -0.103764 -0.152272 -0.088412 1.000000 0.691552 -0.145445 0.111496 0.052719 0.047065 0.044731 0.012948
LOGAREA 0.078250 -0.024463 -0.059711 -0.196689 0.691552 1.000000 -0.173966 0.072341 -0.069087 -0.098423 -0.096543 -0.141134
COR 0.055830 0.144127 0.203168 0.594879 -0.145445 -0.173966 1.000000 0.305598 0.473435 0.587395 0.643877 0.488419
EXT 0.072647 -0.257451 -0.288391 0.350320 0.111496 0.072341 0.305598 1.000000 0.606204 0.473812 0.639111 0.309795
INT -0.060938 -0.217956 -0.267051 0.554261 0.052719 -0.069087 0.473435 0.606204 1.000000 0.779130 0.851330 0.498403
LAO -0.007804 -0.155617 -0.215125 0.684951 0.047065 -0.098423 0.587395 0.473812 0.779130 1.000000 0.841101 0.570044
POL 0.008571 -0.166946 -0.229745 0.753905 0.044731 -0.096543 0.643877 0.639111 0.851330 0.841101 1.000000 0.712861
SOC 0.005363 0.080407 0.084974 0.645154 0.012948 -0.141134 0.488419 0.309795 0.498403 0.570044 0.712861 1.000000 Terrorism
 &
 Drug Prices 42
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Table 18
Expanded R egression Results
β Coefficients
1 2 3 4
Variable Domestic Domestic Transnational Transnational
PCOKE 0.072 - 0.017 -
PHER - 0.013* - 0.003*
LOGGNIPC 6.074*** 5.909** 2.398*** 2.335***
LOGPOP 9.704*** 9.817*** 2.246*** 2.271***
LOGAREA -1.652 -1.723 -0.506 -0.524
COR 5.983*** 4.684* 0.974* 0.658
EXT 4.375*** 4.292*** 1.057*** 1.045***
INT -9.483*** -9 751*** -0.998** -1.056**
LAO -5.195* -4.847* -0.402 -0.317
POL -0.167 0.043 -0.091 -0.041
SOC -0.771 -1.389 -0.528 -0.683*
R2 0.197 0.199 0.081 0.083
Adjusted R2 0.190 0.193 0.071 0.073
Notes: *α=.10; **α=.05; ***α=.01
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Graph 1
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Graph 2
Domestic Terrorist Event Data
Year
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